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Public Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Melvin G. Dakin*
Decisions of this term of the court resulted in additional
jurisprudence interpreting and limiting the power and authority
of Civil Service Commissions under Section 15 (o) (3) of Article
14 of the Louisiana Constitution dealing with reinstatement of
dismissed employees and awards of back pay.
In the case of State ex rel. Anderson v. Walker, Administrator of the Division of Employment Security,1 the Administrator appealed from a judgment of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court ordering payment of back wages for the period June
24, 1953, through October 29, 1954. As has been previously
noted, 2 the court has held that the Civil Service Commission itself cannot order the payment of back pay in those cases where
there has not been a lawful dismissal, i.e., a dismissal preceded
by proper advance notice; as a consequence an employee, successful as Anderson had been in establishing his dismissal as unlawful, a must resort to mandamus proceedings in district court if
an agency refuses to pay despite such a determination.
The administrator assigned a number of errors in his appeal,
two of which are of particular substantive importance with respect to the right of back pay. He successfully maintained that
the Division should not pay interest on the award of back pay
since, as the court stated, "a state or its agencies cannot be compelled to pay interest on unpaid accounts unless provision is
made therefor by stipulation or a specific statute" and there was
"no provision justifying the interest award under consideration." He was not successful in maintaining that wages earned
by an employee from other sources during a period of unlawful
dismissal must be offset against a claim for back pay. The court
cited only the absence of authority for such set-off; there seems
to be supporting analogy for not allowing such set-off, however,
in the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. Thus,
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 233 La. 687, 98 So.2d 153 (1957).
2. Administrative Law, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 79, 80 (1957).
3. Anderson v. Division of Employment Security, 227 La. 432, .79 So.2d 565
(1956).
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while the Board has required account to be taken of earnings of
the employee in other jobs between the time of discharge and an
offer of re-employment, it has severely limited its operation saying, "When an employee, sometime after discharge, obtained a
better paying job than the one he was discharged from, it became profitable for the employer to delay an offer of reinstatement as long as possible, since every day the employee put in on
the better paying job reduced back pay liability."
In Anderson v. Division of Employment Security,5 the court
clears what was probably the remaining open point in this longdrawn-out litigation ;6 it here determines that a dismissal of Anderson on October 29, 1954, in full compliance with requirements
for a lawful dismissal as determined by the court in the companion Boucher litigation, 7 and as to which cause was determined to exist by the Civil Service Commission after full hearing, was properly made by the Administrator.
In Dickson v. Department of Highways,8 the court has occasion to etch out another detail of a lawful dismissal. The Department attempted to dismiss an employee injured on the job after
he had reported back for work and had been found capable of
performing his duties by Department physicians. A notice of
dismissal, issued thereafter, stated as cause that he had not
worked since his injury and that he had accepted a compensation
settlement based on a 25% disability of his right arm; such disability was said to render him useless to the Department. A
Civil Service Commission determination upholding the dismissal
cited as additional cause the fact that he had not obtained a
leave of absence for the period of his disability.
The court held that while inability to perform assigned duties
was a clear legal cause for dismissal from the classified service,
dismissal for such cause must come within the period of disabil4. F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950); Approved sub-nom, Labor
Board v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 347 (1953).
5. 233 La. 694, 98 So.2d 155 (1957).

6. Anderson v. Division of Employment Security, 227 La. 432, 79 So.2d 565
(1954) ; State em rel. Anderson v. Walker, 230 La. 816, 89 So.2d 324 (1956)
State en rel. Anderson v. Walker, 233 La. 687, 98 So.2d 153 (1957).
7. A lawful dismissal must comply with Civil Service Rule XII providing that
"In

every case of removal . . . the appointing authority or his authorized agent

shall furnish the employee and the Director in advance of such action a statement
in writing giving explicit and detailed reasons therefor and shall notify such employee of his right of appeal to the . . . Commission." Boucher v. Division of
Employment Security, 226 La. 227, 75 So.2d 343 (1954) ; Anderson v. Division of
Employment Security, 227 La. 432, 79 So.2d 565 (1954).
8. 234 La. 1082, 102 So.2d 464 (1958).

19591

PUBLIC LAW

ity, not, as here, after an employee had reported back and been
found physically able to go to work. As to the failure to apply
for a leave of absence during disability, the court brushed this
aside as a cause for dismissal saying that "it would be vain and
useless to require an employee to apply for leave of any sort
when he is being paid compensation in lieu of his wages." Leave
by implication would certainly seem plausibly to follow in these
circumstances.
The court found the employee retained his permanent civil
service status and consequently entitled to receive his regular
salary until legally suspended or dismissed, such salary to begin
with the date when he was found physically able to return to
work. As in the Anderson, Day, and Boucher cases, he is left,
however, with the necessity of bringing a mandamus proceeding
in the event such payment is not voluntarily made, the court not
coupling an order for payment with its decree. In view of the
fact that the employee was here properly notified in advance of
his dismissal and only the "cause" was found inadequate, this
would seem a case in which the Civil Service Commission could
have been directed to order "full pay for lost time" pursuant to
Article 14, Section 15(o) (3), of the Constitution; if the Civil
Service Commission cannot order such back pay here, it is difficult to see any circumstances in which it can exercise its constitutional authority except in the narrow context where the dismissal is properly noticed and the Commission, rather than the
court on appeal as here, finds the "cause" deficient. Bennett v.
Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries Commission,9 decided at this
term, seems not to preclude a Civil Service Commission pay
order in this case since there was proper notice of dismissal.
In the Bennett case seismic agents of the Commission had
been unclassified and then dismissed without cause. The Civil
Service Commission first approved but later disproved the unclassification so that the final status of the dismissal without
stated cause was that of an unlawful dismissal as in the Anderson, Day, and Boucher cases; as a consequence the court held the
Commission without power to order back pay. In the Bennett
case, a dissenting Justice protested the narrow construction of
Article 14, Section 15(o) (3), of the Constitution, maintaining
the very plausible position that the provision was on its face applicable to any dismissal found illegal either because of improper
9. 234 La. 678, 101 So.2d 199 (1958).
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notice or because deficient on the merits for failure to establish
the alleged cause. The majority state, as reason for such construction, the fact that the Commission has no status as a court
and cannot enforce its orders. However, despite the possibility
that a recalcitrant agency might on occasion resist such an order
from the Commission and require resort to court enforcement
under Article 14, Section 15 (p) (5), it would seem reasonable to
expect most payments to be made on the strength of such an
order, particularly where the dismissal has not only been found
illegal by the Commission but such illegality has been upheld by
the court. The employee seems entitled to the savings possible
where a Commission order rather than a court order would do
the job.
In King v. Department of Public Safety, 10 employees attacking dismissals for cause on the ground of political or religious
discrimination gained important procedural ground before the
Civil Service Commission. The Commission took the view that
the employee must disprove the specific charges set out as
"cause" for the dismissal, pursuant to Article 14, Section
15(n) (1) (a), of the Constitution, and that if he fails to do so,
it does not make any difference that the true reason for the dismissal was religious or political even though under Section
15(n) (2) and (6) dismissals for such reasons are proscribed.
The Commission consequently refused to consider evidence proffered by the employee purporting to prove the dismissal was for
political reasons.
The court finds this action a basis for reversal and remand
and throws important light on the procedural role of the allegation and proof of political and religious motivations in a dismissal. The evidence must be permitted to come in primarily
because it is pertinent to the truth or falsity of the formal
charges made and hence is essential to affording employee a fair
and impartial trial. Secondly, the court notes that a dismissal is
proper under the Commission's own rules "when the conduct or
performance of an employee has been such that his removal ...
will promote the efficiency of the service." Against the background of this rule, the court concludes that "if the evidence preponderately shows that the appointing authority would not have
taken the disciplinary action except for political or religious reasons or prejudices, it would be proper and, in keeping with the
10. 234 La. 409, 100 So.2d 217 (1958).
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Commission's functions and duties, for it to reverse the dismissal
or other disciplinary action, provided it felt that the assigned
cause was not of such a serious nature as to endanger the efficiency of the service." On remand, under this principle, the
Commission must permit a showing to be made as to whether
the action taken by the appointing authority was founded on an
unexpressed illegal cause such as religion or politics; it must
then determine whether the expressed dereliction is so detrimental to the efficiency of the service that the action of the appointing authority will be allowed to stand when, as here, the
employee has been unable to disprove the verity of the assigned
cause but has shown illegal but unexpressed cause. The Civil
Service Commission may thus no longer make "their only concern ... whether he [the employee] is able to disprove the expressed charges to its satisfaction."
In Reed v. Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries Commission,"
the Civil Service Commission had upheld a dismissal, finding
that "the submission of an expense account which includes expenses for which an employee has already been paid by another
agency, without reporting such payment, is tantamount to the
submission of a false or fraudulent expense account." The employee attacked the Commission holding on the ground that the
appointing authority had charged fraud and had failed to prove
it. The court, however, noted that in any event the expense account had been proven false since it contained the untruth "that
the full amount is justly due" and that "accordingly the Commission did not act illegally or arbitrarily." The court quoted approvingly from two of its recent decisions in this area, Cottingham v. Department of Revenue 2 and Domas v. Division of Employment Security,18 noting that the Domas case was clearly decisive of the issue here. It also cited Konen v. New Orleans Public Department 4 as to be noted. The issue as briefed by employee's counsel was primarily that the appointing authority had
failed to prove the elements of fraud; as the court treats the
matter, proof of the elements of fraud is not essential since filing a false statement had also been charged and this had been
clearly proven. The action was hence not arbitrary on the basis
attacked, namely, failure to prove a charge on which dismissal
was based. The court goes on to note that "moreover, the ques11.
12.
13.
14.

235
232
227
226

La.
La.
La.
La.

124,
546,
490,
739,

102 So.2d 869 (1958).
94 So.2d 662 (1957).
79 So.2d 857 (1955).
77 So.2d 24 (1954).
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tion of the sufficiency and reasonableness of that cause was for
the exclusive determination of such agency." The court is here
undoubtedly referring to "sufficiency and reasonableness of that
cause" as meaning that the phenomenon of filing a false statement is rationally and substantially related to the employee's
qualifications for the position in which he served; in Cottingham, in saying that this was for the "exclusive determination
of the agency," it attached the important caveat appearing in
the following statement:
"If it could be concluded herein that there was no real
and substantial relation between the assigned cause for the
dismissal of appellant and his qualifications for the position
in which he served the action of the Commission in upholding his removal would, of course, be arbitrary and hence subject to annulment by this court as a matter of law. On the
other hand if such a relation existed the question then presented would involve solely the sufficiency or reasonableness
of the cause - a question of fact which the Commission, as
pointed out in the above cited authorities, has the exclusive
right to determine."
In Cottingham, the court also quoted the following important
passage from the Domas case:
"Answering the contention presented under the fifth assignment of error that cause for dismissal was illegal and
not justifiable under the circumstances in which, at the time,
he found himself, we conclude that this involves purely the
reasonablenessof the cause based upon the final and conclusive findings of fact by the Commission, the correctness of
which cannot be inquired into by the courts." (Emphasis
added.)
Taken together, these cases seem to say that in the ad hoc
determination of what shall constitute cause for dismissal the
court will review only to the extent of finding a rational nexus
between the assigned cause and the qualifications for the job; it
will not substitute its judgment as to the "sufficiency and reasonableness" of that relation. On the other hand, the court also
cites Konen v. New Orleans Police Department" but without
quoting its doctrine; it seems fair to conclude that that doctrine
still retains its vigor where, as in that case, a question is raised
15. Ibid.
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as to the sufficiency of proof of the operative facts and as to the
propriety of the inferences drawn from such facts that they were
within the ultimate facts constituting the assigned cause. In
Konen the following quotation is approvingly made and followed:
".... the reviewing court will ordinarily inquire only whether
the officer, board, or commission had jurisdiction, acted within the prescribed rules, and followed the form of proceedings
legally applicable in such cases; and the court will not disturb
the order or decision on its merits, or interfere with the exercise of the discretion vested in the officer, board, or commission, unless the action of the board or commission was
arbitrary.... Where the decision is based on substantialevidence, the court may not consider the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence.... the burden of proving arbitrary action in
the discharge of the employee is on the employee. (Emphasis
added) 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 740c(1), pp.
1523-1524." The court then said ". . . it is not the province
of this Court to consider the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, our appellate jurisdiction being limited to questions
of law alone."
The case of Mayerhafer v. Department of Police16 brings
home very clearly the difficulties of staying within the foregoing
admonition that "it is not the province of this court to consider
the weight or sufficiency of the evidence" and at the same time
of applying the principle that an administrative decision must be
based on substantial evidence. These difficulties would perhaps
have been in sharper focus if the Commission had made findings
as to the existence of valid cause for the dismissal here in question instead of determining, as it did, only that "the discharging
department head might have concluded valid cause existed for
appellant's dismissal." Despite this lack of findings, however,
the court held that "there was no probative evidence by which
either the appointing authority or the Commission could find
that the present appellant either knew or should have known of
the graft system [on the knowledge of which his dismissal was
based]."
This would seem to inject the additional requirement that
there be "probative evidence" as well as "some evidence" for the
court to refrain from disturbing an administrative determina16. 235 La. 437, 104 So.2d 163 (1958).
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tion of fact and would of course require the determination of
whether the evidence was "probative."
At last term, in Jordanv. New Orleans Police Department,17
the court refused to disturb an administrative finding of fact of
drunkenness where there was some evidence to support either
the hypothesis that the police officer was drunk or that he merely appeared drunk because of receiving a blow in the face. The
court noted that '"this Court is without authority to examine
into the question of the weight or sufficiency of the evidence to
establish intoxication." In the Mayerhafer case there was testimony from the operator of the system of bribery that he had
discussed the system with the appellant police captain and there
was also testimony from the operator, on cross-examination, that
he could not swear that a system of graft was actually in existence during the period when appellant police captain was
charged with knowledge of the existence of the system. There
was also evidence from other witnesses pro and con on the existence of the system during this period. Appellant testified that
he had no knowledge whatsoever of a bribery system in operation
during the period.
In these circumstances, when the court concludes, as it does,
that there was no probative evidence to support an inference of
knowledge, it would seem to be, as noted, modifying its rule that
"some evidence to support the finding of the Commission" precludes the court's examining the weight or sufficiency of evidence. The rule would seem now to be "some probative evidence"
will preclude such examination. But is not a determination that
there is no probative evidence to support a finding itself an examination of "weight or sufficiency"? And is it not then taking
the court into issues of credibility which the rule as previously
formulated abjures? It seems clear that it is here resolving for
itself issues of credibility which had previously been resolved
by the appointing authority but not by the Commission. Perhaps
what the court is implicitly saying is that where the trier of facts
(here the Commission) fails to resolve issues of credibility the
court will then examine weight and sufficiency itself instead of
remanding the case. In this view the court is reviewing somewhat in the pattern developed in the Universal Camera case by
the United States Supreme Court.1 8
17. 232 La. 926, 95 So.2d 607 (1957).
18. Universal Camera Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S.
474 (1951). Commented on in Administrative Law, Substantial Evidence on the
Record Considered as a Whole, 12 LOuiSIANA LAw REviEw 290 (1952).
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In that case the National Labor Relations Board resolved
issues of credibility contrary to the resolution of those issues by
its own trial examiner; and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the Board's order on the ground that it was supported by substantial evidence when it accepted, as it held it
must, the Board's resolution of credibility issues. On review of
the case, the United States Supreme Court interpreted a provision contained in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
that a reviewing court "shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... unsup-

ported by substantial evidence"' 19 and in the Taft-Hartley amendment to the Wagner Act that "the findings of the Board with
respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole shall .

.

. be conclusive." 20

These provisions were said to broaden the scope of previous review to encompass consideration of a difference of opinion in the
record between examiner and agency. By the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals these provisions had thus been too narrowly
construed but correctly construed by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals 21 to mean that the issue of credibility was, in these circumstances, open to it; as a consequence, if the Court resolved
the issue contrary to the Board and thus removed a key fact in
the otherwise "substantial evidence" supporting the Board's
findings, it would be free to reverse.
Here, in the Mayerhafer case, there has been no initial resolution of the credibility issue by the trier of fact and it can be
argued that an appellate court is free to resolve the issue of credibility on a "cold" record in these circumstances also and, if
thereby there remains insufficient evidence to constitute "substantial evidence" or "persuasiveness," to reverse. This case is
weaker, however, since in Universal Camera there was a resolution of credibility by a trier of fact who saw the witnesses; here,
in Mayerhafer, there has been no such initial resolution; remand
for such purpose would seem preferable to the court's being the
initial tribunal to make the findings.2
However, even assuming the court limits its requirement of
19. 60 STAT. 237, 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1000 et seq., § 1009(e) (1952).
20. 61 STAT. 136, 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., § 160(f) (1952).
21. National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Company, 180
F.2d 731 (6th Cir., 1950), granted certiorari along with the Universal Camera
case, supra, note 18.
22. This was a part of the basis for dissent by one of the Justices, 235 La.
437, 104 So.2d 163, 168 (1958).
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"probative" evidence to the resolution of credibility issues in the
Mayerhafer circumstances, the present rule as it stands is not
wholly satisfactory; the rule states that "some" evidence, however slight, will be sufficient to preclude an examination of the
weight or sufficiency, that is to say the credibility, relevance,
and substantiality of such evidence. Yet the court has set findings of fact aside, as in the Day case, 28 where there was some
evidence to sustain the finding. In doing so the court has obviously been dissatisfied with the "weight and sufficiency" of
the evidence but has had to label the Commission finding as arbitrary and capricious in order to judicially set it aside.
The substantial evidence rule as it has been etched out in
statute and jurisprudence governing the review of federal administrative action would seem to provide a more satisfactory
solution and at the same time provide the legislatively intended
degree of finality to administrative fact findings. Thus the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides that "no sanction
shall be imposed or rule or order issued except... as supported
by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence."24 It further provides as to scope of judicial review
that "the reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... unsup-

ported by substantial evidence." Within this statutory pattern,
albeit somewhat unevenly, the federal courts continue to apply
a rule of review which requires the reviewing court to satisfy itself that the finding is supported by substantial, i.e., persuasive
evidence, without examining into the credibility of witnesses except to the limited extent permitted under the Universal Camera
decision, 25 but obviously making judgments as to the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence otherwise. If such a review establishes that there were two fairly conflicting findings to be made
from the evidence, the reviewing court will not be free to set
aside whichever one the agency has made; in this area, in other
words, the administrative determination of fact will be final. If,
on the other hand, on the court's appraisal of the evidence, reasonable men could not have differed as to which of two findings
were supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court will
be free to set the finding aside. An illustration used by the
23. Day v. Department of Institutions, 231 La. 775, 93 So.2d 1 (1957), commented on in 18 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 79, 82 (1957).
24. 60 STAT. 237, 241, 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1000 et seq., }1006(c),
§1009(e) (1952).
25. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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United States Supreme Court in 1942 in NLRB v. Nevada Con26
well illustrates the area of adminsolidated Copper Corporation
istrative finality as the Court conceives it under the rule. After
pointing out that the record contained substantial evidence from
which the Board could have concluded that the company's refusal to employ certain men was because of threats made to destroy property and to injure employees, but substantial evidence
also supported the Board's conclusion that the purpose was discouragement of membership in a labor union, the Court held:
"The possibility of drawing either of two inconsistent inferences
from the evidence did not prevent the Board from drawing one
of them.... If the findings of the Board are supported by [substantial] evidence the courts are not free to set them aside, even
'27
though the Board could have drawn different inferences.
In two cases during the term the court affirmed judgments
annulling orders of the Louisiana Public Service Commission requiring continuance of passenger train service in the public convenience and necessity. 28 In the Texas & New Orleans case, 29 the
court found the order requiring continuance unsupported by the
evidence. In the Rock Island case,3 0 the court approved a district court finding that "a review of the evidence shows beyond
any question of a doubt that public necessity does not require the
operation of the trains and public convenience will not be substantially affected by their discontinuance." In making the findings the reviewing courts accepted the criteria for determining
the public convenience and necessity as proffered by counsel for
the Commission.3 1
26. 316 U.S. 105 (1942).
27. For a recent criticism of the rule see Cooper, The "Substantial Evidence"
Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945 (1958).
28. In the Transportation Act of 1958, Congress has now provided for the
supercedence of state regulatory authority over train discontinuance upon the filing of appropriate notification to the Interstate Commerce Commission. 75 STAT.
568, 1958 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, No. 13, pp. 29722974.
29. Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 233 La. 787, 98 So.2d 189 (1957).
30. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, 234 La. 462, 100 So.2d 471 (1958).
31. "A board or commission in deciding what train service shall be provided
by a railroad must be guided in its determination by the public convenience and
necessity in relation to such service; and where it is sought to discontinue certain
service the controlling criteria are the character and population of the territory
served, public patronage or lack thereof, the remaining transportation facilities,
the expense of operation as compared with revenue therefrom, and the financial
condition of the railroad as a whole." 74 Corpus Juris Secundum, Railroads
Section 418 (3).
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As to the scope of judicial review accorded the Commission's
findings, it seems clear that the court here, as in other cases
coming up from this Commission, is going substantially beyond
the rule applied in Civil Service Commission cases that "this
court is without authority to examine the weight or sufficiency
of evidence where there is some evidence to support the finding
of the Commission. 8' 2 Here, reliance is rather upon the formulation that "orders of the Public Service Commission, like those of
other administrative bodies acting under a delegation of discretionary authority, should be accorded great weight and will not
be overturned by the courts in the absence of a clear showing of
abuse of power."83 Here, the implication is clear that even
though there was some evidence in the record to support the
Commission order, the preponderance or weight of the evidence,
in the judgment of the court, was against the order. Thus, the
latter rule seems to permit an inquiry into weight and sufficiency.
Respecting the appropriateness of application of the latter
rule to the Commission findings and the resulting possibility of
substitution of judgment as to the weight of the evidence, the
statute granting review seems so drawn as to contemplate such
substitution; it makes no provision for finality of Commission
findings of fact, providing only that the primary jurisdiction of
the Commission must be respected. 4 That done, "the court may
affirm the order of the commission complained of, or it may
change, modify, alter, or set it aside, as justice may require."8 5
This is to be compared with the categorical language of the Civil
Service law respecting appeals that "the decision of the appropriate Civil Service Commission shall be final on the facts, but
an appeal shall be granted to the Supreme Court of Louisiana on
any question of law." 36
In Plantation Anhydrous Ammonia Corporation v. Anhydrous Ammonia Commission,8 7 a rule enacted by the Commission
was under attack on the ground that its enactment was influenced by bias and prejudice and on the ground that it was unrea32. Mayerhafer v. Department of Police, 235 La. 437, 104 So.2d 163 (1958).
33. Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
279, 69 So.2d 43, 47 (1953).
34.224
LA.La.R.S.
1950, 45:1194 provides that new evidence introduced at the trial
court level must be referred to the Commission for primary consideration and for
report back to the court.
35. LA. R.S. 1950, 45:1192.
36. LA. CONST. art. 14, § 15(o) (1).
37. 234 La. 869, 101 So.2d 699 (1958).
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sonable, arbitrary, and unjustified. The rule adopted proscribed
the dispensing of anhydrous ammonia from railway tank cars
except into bulk storage. Appellant, a tank car distributor of
ammonia, was put out of business as a result of the rule and
sought to enjoin the Commission from enforcing it.
The basis for his attack on the Commission rule on the
grounds of bias was the membership on the Commission of two
bulk station dealers in ammonia alleged to be in competition with
tank car dispensers; their competitive interest in eliminating
competition was urged as precluding them from being able to act
impartially and solely on the basis of statutory considerations of
public safety. The court examined the actual extent of competition between this relator and the two dealer members and found
it non-existent as to one and so limited as not to have the effect
per se of creating bias, prejudice, or self-interest as to the other.
The decision does not indicate the extent of tank car distribution
but the implication seems to be that appellant is the only such
distributor in the state. The court then goes on to find no probative evidence that either of the commissioners was prejudicially
influenced in this action.
On the merits of the rule, the court quotes approvingly from
Ruling Case Law38 that a court will not substitute its judgment
upon a question of policy except where the unreasonableness of
such policy is so manifest as to show bad faith. Here, there were
evidently abundant data bearing on both the relative dangers of
tank car distribution and bulk station distribution; the court did
not find the regulation arbitrary since it had a rational basis in
safety considerations.
It is to be noted that the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (which Louisiana has not adopted) provides as to
adoption of rules that "prior to the adoption of any rule authorized by law, or the amendment or repeal thereof, the adopting
agency shall as far as practicable, publish or otherwise circulate
notice of its intended action and afford interested persons opportunity to submit data or views orally or in writing." 39 It is also
to be noted that the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides that "the functions of . . . officers participating in decisions.., shall be conducted in an impartial manner. Any such
38. 19 Ruling Case Law 807-810.
39. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
STATE LAWS 329, 330, § 2(3) (1944).

OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
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officer may at any time withdraw if he deems himself disqualified; and upon the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient
affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of any such officer,
the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record and
' 40
decision in the case.
It is, of course, only speculation but it would seem that provisions such as the foregoing, providing for public hearings and
providing machinery for precipitating recusation before action
is taken, might have the salutary effect of eliminating such
troublesome issues in advance; at least where, as here, the rule is
in any event firmly anchored only in proper rule-making considerations.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
Constitutional issues were presented in ten of the cases decided at the last term. Seven of these posed traditional issues
in the field- two each under due process and interstate commerce clauses; and one each in the areas of self-incrimination,
delegation of legislative power and equal protection of the laws.
Three other cases raised questions of special or local concern
arising under the provisions of the State Constitution. The cases
will be discussed in the order just mentioned.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A pair of interesting and contrasting cases arising under the
due process clause served to illustrate the distinction which has
come to be drawn between legislative measures imposing economic regulation on the one hand and those relating to individual
liberty on the other. At bottom, the basic issue in such cases is
the weight to be accorded the presumption of constitutionality
which is said to attend all legislative enactments. In the area of
economic affairs the Supreme Court of the United States, which
earlier had exhibited a marked tendency to "second-guess" legislative bodies in appraising the wisdom of legislation, announced
in 1937 that where the merits of such regulation are honestly
debatable the "legislature is entitled to its judgment," despite
40. 60

STAT.

237, 241 (1946) ; 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1952).

*Late Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

